

RUNNING HEAD: MULTICULTURALISM AND PERSUASIVENESS

Ideology and Voice: Salient Multiculturalism Enhances Ethnic Minority Group Members'  
Persuasiveness in Intergroup Interaction

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Author Notes

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### Abstract

What situational forces might enhance ethnic minority group members' voice and ability to exert social influence during exchanges with dominant group members? Two experiments involving face-to-face dyadic intergroup interaction examined whether making multiculturalism salient to minority group members would increase the extent to which they persuaded a dominant interaction partner of their own point of view on a series of controversial social issues. Results were consistent with this hypothesis and further indicated that minority group members expressed their own point of view more clearly and directly when multicultural ideology was made salient to them as compared to when it was not, which contributed (marginally) to their heightened persuasiveness. Salient multiculturalism did not have comparable effects on dominant group members' persuasiveness or clarity of expression. These results raise the possibility that making multicultural ideology salient might set the stage for minority group members to have a stronger voice in intergroup exchanges.

**KEYWORDS:** Ideology; Intergroup Interaction; Persuasion; Intergroup Relations

Ideology and Voice: Salient Multiculturalism Enhances Ethnic Minority Group Members' Persuasiveness in Intergroup Interaction

Efforts to improve intergroup relations and enhance intergroup equality often involve promoting any of a variety of different intergroup ideologies that communicate prescriptive social norms about how intergroup contexts should be navigated. For example, public service announcements and educational materials and activities frequently advise individuals to “Celebrate Diversity!”, “Stop Discrimination!”, or “See the Person, Not the Color!” and thereby advocate multiculturalism, anti-racism, or color-blindness respectively.

For the most part, research probing the effects of being exposed to such messages has centered on implications for the positivity of dominant group members' attitudes and behavior toward ethnic minority group members. However, recent theoretical perspectives have highlighted that a focus on prejudice reduction may neglect other outcomes and processes that are equally (or more) important to social change toward greater equality (e.g., Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012). The need to broaden the scope of analysis here is further reinforced by research indicating that in intergroup contexts minority group members attach more value to being respected than to being liked (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010) and, relative to dominant group members, are more interested in discussing power and social change than topics likely to foster positive feelings (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008).

Accordingly, the present research investigated the effects of salient intergroup ideology on ethnic minority group members' ability to exert social influence during face-to-face exchanges with dominant group members in which controversial but important social issues were discussed. Our main hypothesis was that making multiculturalism salient to minority group

members would increase the extent to which they persuaded a dominant interaction partner of their own point of view on the issues.

There are multiple complementary paths through which such an effect might arise. Perhaps most relevant, recent research indicates that by highlighting that minority group members make unique and valuable contributions to society and that their perspective is important, this ideology enhances ethnic minority group members' feelings of power and control (Vorauer & Quesnel, in press). For example, in one study minority group members reported feeling more powerful if they had just read a passage advocating multicultural ideology than if they had not, and this effect was mediated by an increase in their sense of making a meaningful contribution that was triggered by the multiculturalism prime. Power-enhancing implications of salient multiculturalism for minority group members were also evident in one study involving (ostensible) intergroup interaction and in another study in which implicit self-power associations were assessed.

Given that a psychological sense of power increases action orientation (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), enhances the congruence between individuals' inner states and outward behavior (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003), and reduces inhibition (Keltner et al., 2003), we expected that rendering multiculturalism salient would leave minority group members less vulnerable to worries about the consequences of disagreement, more focused on pursuing their own personal goals, and ready to assert their opinions. Accordingly, our main hypothesis was that ethnic minority group members would be more apt to convince a dominant interaction partner of their own point of view when multicultural ideology was made salient to them, as compared to when it was not. We further anticipated that a tendency for minority group members

to express their own point of view more clearly and directly when primed with multiculturalism would contribute to this effect.

### Study 1

The main goal of Study 1 was to test our hypothesis that salient multiculturalism would enhance minority group members' persuasiveness. For comparison purposes we included conditions in which color-blindness and anti-racism were primed. As the tenets of color-blind ideology run directly counter to those of multiculturalism in many ways we could see no grounds for expecting that this ideology would enhance minority group members' clarity of expression or persuasiveness.

Our predictions for anti-racism were less clear. At the same time as this ideology primes a power dynamic in which minority group members are vulnerable to being the target of prejudice and discrimination, it also tries to undermine this very dynamic by emphasizing a moral imperative to treat minority group members fairly. However, as emerging research from our laboratory has revealed trends for salient anti-racism to enhance minority group members' feelings of power (Vorauer & Quesnel, in press), it seemed possible that this ideology might operate similarly to multiculturalism if feelings of power are important to enhanced persuasiveness.

So as to test our hypotheses in the context of a particularly strained intergroup relationship characterized by large status differences (Vorauer & Sakamoto, 2008) and marginalization (Macdonald, 2015, January), Study 1 examined interactions between White and Indigenous Canadians.

### *Method*

For both experiments, we report our focal measures and all manipulations (see the supplemental document for all measures not reported in the main text, an explanation of all participant exclusions, and results of multi-level modeling analyses treating dyad as the unit of analysis).

### *Participants*

Participants were 75 same-sex pairs of introductory psychology students (55 female) comprised of one White and one Indigenous individual who took part in the study for partial course credit or \$15.00. The Indigenous participant in each pair was randomly assigned to condition (cell *Ns* were 19, 20, 17, and 19 for the Control, Anti-Racism, Color-Blindness, and Multiculturalism conditions respectively).<sup>1</sup> In each of two academic years we recruited all of the Indigenous participants that we could, along with White partners.

Recruiting large numbers of participants is challenging in labor-intensive lab-based studies. This is especially true in research with members of specific groups who are a minority in the general population and often even more so in university student samples. Accordingly, our participant recruitment efforts were particularly energetic and in this study spanned multiple academic years. Notably, however, our study design allowed us to capitalize on "alternative and equally effective strategies" for increasing statistical power noted by McClelland (2000, p. 963), such as running participants in a highly controlled and involving experimental context that would enhance the quality of our data and thereby reduce the mean square error (see also Funder et al., 2014).

### *Procedure*

Each pair member arrived at a different location for a study of "social perception in first meeting situations" and pair members were kept separate except for the discussion and

debriefing. There were two different White female experimenters. As a cover story, the experimenter told participants that the researchers were interested in the effects of different modes of communication, with some pairs talking face-to-face (as they would) and others exchanging written information. She then informed them that the researchers were interested in interactions between people with different ethnic backgrounds and that their partner had a different ethnic background than they did.

*Ideology Manipulation.* Next, the experimenter then administered the ideology manipulation to the Indigenous participant, explaining: "We have found that it helps participants to reflect on issues relevant to intergroup interaction before proceeding to the next part of the exchange, in order to make their views more accessible and better prepare them to answer the questions that we ask after the interaction is over." The manipulation was similar to the one used by Vorauer, Gagnon, and Sasaki (2009) and directly based on Wolsko, Park, and Judd's (2000) procedures. The multicultural ideology emphasized that "different cultural groups bring different perspectives to life" and "each ethnic group within Canada can contribute in its own unique way." The color-blind ideology emphasized that "we must remember that we are all first and foremost human beings," and "at our core, we really are all the same." The anti-racist ideology emphasized that "stamping out racism is essential if we are to achieve harmony among the many ethnic groups represented in Canada." Participants in the control condition received no message.

The Indigenous participant then indicated his or her opinion regarding six controversial social issues, namely euthanasia, government restrictions to protect the environment, tuition increases, abortion, capital punishment, and immigration (e.g., "There should be no legal restrictions on abortion in Canada"). Participants indicated their agreement with each statement on a 10-point scale where 1 = *strongly disagree* and 10 = *strongly agree*. The experimenter left

participants alone to complete the sheet. During this time the White participant indicated his or her opinions regarding the same issues.

Pair members were then introduced prior to having a 12-minute discussion of the six issues, which was videotaped with participants' permission (ten pairs declined and had the discussion without being recorded).

*Change toward Partner.* Immediately after the discussion both pair members answered the social issues questions again. The key dependent measure was the extent to which White individuals changed their opinions in the direction of their Indigenous partner's answers. A "change toward partner" index was computed by subtracting the absolute difference between the White individual's second answer to each issue and their Indigenous partner's initial answer (post-discussion difference) from the absolute difference between the White individual's initial answer and their Indigenous partner's initial answer (pre-discussion difference) and dividing this by the number of issues on which there was non-zero initial disagreement (without disagreement no movement toward partner was possible). Higher (positive) scores reflect less difference at the end of the discussion than at the beginning, that is, more change by targets toward their Indigenous partner's ingoing position. For comparison purposes we also computed the extent to which Indigenous individuals changed their opinions toward those initially reported by their White partner.

*Clarity of Behavioral Expression.* Three independent coders who were blind to experimental condition and to participants' self-reported opinions viewed the discussions and estimated Indigenous participants' opinion on each issue, using the same response scale that participants used. Coders were instructed to make their ratings according to the opinions that participants expressed at the beginning of the discussion of each issue. Coders' ratings were



averaged together ( $\alpha_s = .88$  to  $.94$  across the six items).<sup>2</sup> To index behavioral clarity, we then computed within-participant correlations between Indigenous participants' initial self-reported opinions and coders' ratings across the six items and applied Fisher's  $z$  transformation. Higher correlations reflect that when Indigenous participants started discussing the issues with their White partner, the opinions they expressed more closely corresponded to their actual self-reported opinions.


### *Results*

We began by testing for nonindependence by computing the intraclass correlation between actors' and targets' opinion change scores using the double-entry procedure and controlling for initial disagreement (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006). The value ( $ICC = .033$ ,  $z = 0.286$ ,  $p = .775$ ) was nonsignificant and below the level of consequential nonindependence (.45) identified by Kenny et al. (for Study 2,  $ICC = -.13$ ,  $z = 1.32$ ,  $p = .187$ ).

Accordingly, the extent to which White participants changed their opinions toward those initially reported by their Indigenous partner was analyzed in one-way Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) in which ideology condition (Control, Anti-Racism, Color-Blindness, or Multiculturalism) was the independent variable. Notably, more extreme disagreement presents more opportunity for change: Individuals who start out close to their partner cannot move toward their partner as much as those who start out far away. Further, our design was ambitious in bringing in strangers to talk about controversial issues while leaving initial disagreement up to chance. Thus we controlled for the extent of participants' initial disagreement (total absolute discrepancies across all items), which was quite variable ( $M = 16.47$  scale points, range 4 to 34).<sup>3</sup>

This analysis yielded a marginal omnibus effect for ideology,  $F(3, 70) = 2.68$ ,  $p = .053$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = 0.103$  (see Figure 1). White participants changed their opinions toward those initially

reported by their Indigenous partner more when their partner had been primed with multiculturalism than when there was no prime,  $t(70) = 2.31, p = .024, \eta_p^2 = 0.071$ , or a color-blindness prime,  $t(70) = 2.02, p = .047, \eta_p^2 = 0.055$ . There was no significant difference across the multiculturalism and anti-racism conditions, with the latter showing a marginal difference from the control condition in the same direction as multiculturalism,  $t(70) = 1.91, p = .060, \eta_p^2 = 0.050$ . Greater initial disagreement was positively associated with change,  $F(1, 70) = 38.84, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.357$ . Without the covariate,  $\hat{Y}$ s = 0.03, 0.40, -0.19, and 0.39 for the control, anti-racist, color-blind, and multicultural conditions respectively; the only significant contrasts were between the multicultural and anti-racist conditions and the color-blind condition,  $ps = .033$  and  $.028$  respectively,  $F(3, 71) = 2.39, p = .076, \eta_p^2 = 0.092$  for the omnibus effect.



*Figure 1.* White participants' mean change per item toward their Indigenous partner's initial opinions (covariate-adjusted) as a function of ideology condition (Study 1). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Interestingly, a parallel exploratory analysis of the extent to which Indigenous participants changed their opinions toward those initially reported by their White partner yielded an omnibus effect for ideology,  $F(3, 70) = 3.07, p = .033, \eta_p^2 = 0.116$ . Indigenous participants primed with anti-racism ( $M = -0.20, SE = 0.19$ ) or color-blindness ( $M = -0.02, SE = 0.21$ ) were less likely to move their opinions toward those initially expressed by their partner than were those in the control condition ( $M = 0.60, SE = 0.20$ ),  $t(70) = 2.90, p = .005, \eta_p^2 = 0.107$ , and  $t(70) = 2.14, p = .036, \eta_p^2 = 0.061$ , respectively; for multiculturalism ( $M = 0.21, SE = 0.20$ ) this contrast was not significant,  $t(70) = 1.42, p = .160, \eta_p^2 = 0.028$ . Greater initial disagreement was positively associated with change,  $F(1, 70) = 34.04, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.327$ . Excluding the covariate does not change which effects are statistically significant.


#### *Mediation by Clarity of Behavioral Expression*

Next we examined whether enhanced clarity in Indigenous individuals' outward expressions of their opinions helped account for the effect of the multiculturalism prime on the extent to which they persuaded their White partner. We followed the procedures specified by Hayes and Preacher (2014) for multicategorical independent variables, creating three dummy-coded contrast vectors that compared each of the ideology conditions with the no-ideology control condition (e.g., for the multicultural contrast, multicultural = 1, and all other conditions = 0).

We first conducted a preliminary regression analysis to test our hypothesis that being primed with multiculturalism would enhance the extent to which Indigenous individuals expressed their points of view clearly and directly. The within-participant correlation between Indigenous participants' initial self-reported opinions and coders' ratings of the opinions they expressed across the six items was the outcome, and the ideology contrasts were the predictors.

Because attitudinal confidence is associated with expressing more extreme opinions (see, e.g., Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993) it seemed possible that Indigenous individuals might simply express more extreme attitudes when primed with multiculturalism by virtue of feelings of strength and confidence induced by this ideology, which would set the stage for higher correlations. Accordingly, to hone in more precisely on clear expression of inner feelings – the outcome of interest – we entered coders' ratings of the average extremity of the points of view expressed (i.e., mean absolute difference from the scale midpoint of 5.5;  $\alpha = .86$ ) as a covariate.

Consistent with predictions, the multiculturalism contrast was significant, revealing that Indigenous individuals' outward expressions of their opinions more closely corresponded to what they had privately reported before the discussion when they were primed with multiculturalism than when there was no prime,  $t(59) = 2.06, p = .044, \eta_p^2 = 0.067$  (see Figure 2). Although once again the effect of anti-racism was in the same direction as the effect of multiculturalism  $t(59) = 1.61, p = .113, \eta_p^2 = 0.042$ , there were no other significant effects apart from those of the covariate: More extreme attitudes expressed were associated with higher behavior-attitude correspondence,  $t(59) = 2.41, p = .019, \eta_p^2 = 0.090$ . Without the covariate,  $\hat{Y}$ s = 0.89, 1.23, 0.93, and 1.29 for the control, anti-racist, color-blind, and multicultural conditions respectively; the only significant or marginal contrast was between the multiculturalism and control condition,  $p = .091$ .



*Figure 2.* Predicted values for Fisher's z-transformed correlation between Indigenous individuals' initial self-reported attitudes and attitudes expressed during their discussion with their White partner as a function of ideology condition (Study 1). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

We then used the PROCESS macro v2.13 for SPSS (model 4, with 10,000 bootstrap samples) to test mediation. Following Hayes and Preacher (2014), the color-blind and anti-racist contrasts were entered as covariates in this analysis (along with initial disagreement and extremity of opinions expressed). Results provided evidence of the predicted indirect path from salient multiculturalism to enhanced persuasiveness through greater clarity of expression, although the effect was marginal by two-tailed significance standards [90% CI: 0.0021, 0.3127]. Thus this analysis provided some evidence that salient multiculturalism enhanced minority group members' persuasiveness because it prompted them to express their opinions more clearly. No

such indirect path was evident for anti-racism or color-blindness, [90% CI -0.0052, 0.2655] and [90% CI -0.1135, 0.0576] respectively. There was no evidence of mediation for any ideology when the covariates were not included.

### *Discussion*

In line with predictions, ethnic minority group members who were exposed to multicultural ideology prior to a face-to-face discussion with a White interaction partner about controversial social issues convinced their partner to move his or her opinions in the direction of their own ingoing opinions to a greater extent than did those who did not receive an ideology prime. The results further suggested that minority group members primed with multiculturalism communicated their own opinions more clearly and directly, which contributed (marginally) to their being more persuasive. As anticipated, the effects of multiculturalism were clearly distinct from those of color-blindness.

There was some indication that anti-racism might have effects similar to those of multiculturalism, although the results for anti-racism were not statistically significant. This pattern is intriguing in light of recent evidence suggesting that anti-racism tends to have positive effects on ethnic minority group members' feelings of power that are also similar to, but weaker than, those of multiculturalism (Vorauer & Quesnel, in press).

Interestingly, minority group members were less apt to shift their opinions toward those of their White partner when they had reflected on anti-racism or color-blindness before the interaction, whereas this was not the case for multiculturalism. The fact that multiculturalism did not prompt reduced responsiveness makes sense in light of research connecting multiculturalism with perspective-taking (Todd & Galinsky, 2012) and an other-focused learning orientation (Vorauer & Sasaki, 2011).

## Study 2

Study 2 was designed to replicate the key findings of Study 1 and address the question of whether the implications of salient multiculturalism for persuasiveness are unique to minority group members. Our main hypothesis was that, as in Study 1, rendering multiculturalism salient would enhance minority group members' persuasiveness and that enhanced clarity with which they communicated their own opinions would help account for this effect. In addition, because multiculturalism is typically interpreted as focusing on the unique contributions made by minority group members and dominant group members do not feel included by this ideology (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, & Sanchez-Burks, 2011) and are not empowered by it (Vorauer & Quesnel, in press), we expected the persuasiveness-enhancing effect of salient multiculturalism to be specific to minority group members. In this study minority group members had any of a variety of different ethnic backgrounds.

### *Method*

#### *Participants*

Participants were 97 same-sex pairs of introductory psychology students (54 female) who took part in the study for partial course credit or \$15.00. We recruited all of the ethnic minority participants that we possibly could for this study in one academic year, along with White partners. Each pair was comprised of one White and one ethnic minority individual (37 South Asian, 21 Chinese, 12 Arab/West Asian, 11 Latin American, eight Southeast Asian, five Korean, and three Other). Pairs were randomly assigned to one cell in the 2 (Actor Ethnicity: White vs. Minority) x 2 (Ideology Condition: Control vs. Multicultural) design; cell *N*s ranged from 22 to 25.

#### *Procedure*

The procedure and measures were the same as in Study 1 except that there was one White male experimenter and whether the White or ethnic minority pair member received the ideological message (the “actor”) varied across pairs; we refer to an actor’s partner as the “target.” As well, multiculturalism was the only ideological message, and the abortion social issues item was replaced with one regarding French language rights in Canada.


### *Results*

The extent to which targets changed their opinions toward those initially reported by their partner (the “actor”) was analyzed in a 2 (Actor Ethnicity: White vs. Minority) x 2 (Ideology Condition: Control vs. Multicultural) ANCOVA in which, as in Study 1, participants’ initial disagreement ( $M = 14.94$  scale points, range 6 to 25) was entered as a covariate.

This analysis yielded an Actor Ethnicity x Ideology Condition interaction,  $F(1, 92) = 5.40, p = .022, \eta_p^2 = 0.055$  (see Figure 3). Consistent with the results of Study 1, White participants changed their opinions toward those initially reported by their minority partner more when their partner had been primed with multiculturalism than when there was no prime,  $F(1, 92) = 5.34, p = .023, \eta_p^2 = 0.055$ . In contrast, whether or not White actors were primed with multiculturalism did not significantly affect the extent to which they persuaded their minority partner to move his or her opinions in their direction,  $F(1, 92) = 0.92, p = .341, \eta_p^2 = 0.010$ . In the control condition minority individuals changed their opinions in the direction of those initially reported by their White partner more than vice versa,  $F(1, 92) = 6.08, p = .016, \eta_p^2 = 0.062$ ; this effect was eradicated in the multiculturalism condition,  $F(1, 92) = 0.40, p = .397, \eta_p^2 = 0.008$ . Greater initial disagreement was positively associated with change,  $F(1, 92) = 15.53, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.144$ . Without the covariate,  $M_s = 0.48$  and  $0.31$  for the White actor control and multiculturalism conditions and  $-0.06$  and  $0.39$  for the ethnic minority actor control and



multicultural conditions respectively; the only significant or marginal contrasts were for the ideology simple effect for minority actors ( $p = .057$ ) and for the difference between White and minority actors' persuasiveness in the control condition ( $p = .021$ ).



*Figure 3.* Target participants' mean change per item toward their partner's initial opinions (covariate-adjusted) as a function of actor ethnicity and ideology condition (Study 2). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. When actors are White targets have an ethnic minority background and vice versa.


A parallel analysis of change in actors' opinions yielded no effects apart from that of the initial disagreement covariate,  $F(1, 92) = 25.34, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = 0.216$ . There were no effects when the covariate was excluded.

#### *Mediation by Clarity of Behavioral Expression*

Next we examined whether enhanced clarity in minority group members' outward expressions of their opinions helped account for the effect of the multiculturalism prime on the extent to which they persuaded their White interaction partner. Here we compared each of the other three conditions with the minority actor/no-ideology control condition, focusing in particular on the "minority multiculturalism" contrast, where the minority actor/multicultural condition was coded 1 and all others were coded 0; contrasts were similarly computed for the two White actor conditions.

We first conducted a preliminary regression analysis to test our hypothesis that being primed with multiculturalism would enhance minority actors' clear and direct expressions of their points of view. The within-participant correlation between minority actors' initial self-reported opinions and coders' ratings of the opinions they expressed across the six items ( $\alpha$ s = .87 to .94 for coder reliability) was the outcome, and the contrasts described above were the predictors. As in Study 1, we entered coders' ratings of the average extremity of the points of view expressed ( $\alpha$  = .80 for coder reliability) as a covariate.

The minority multiculturalism contrast was marginally significant, revealing that minority actors' outward expressions of their opinions tended to correspond more closely to what they had privately reported before the discussion when they were primed with multiculturalism as compared to when there was no prime,  $t(84) = 1.97, p = .053, \eta_p^2 = 0.044$ . There were no other effects apart from that of the extremity covariate,  $t(84) = 2.36, p = .021, \eta_p^2 = 0.062$  (see Figure 4). Without the covariate,  $M$ s = 1.18 and 1.20 for the White actor control and multiculturalism conditions and 0.91 and 1.27 for the ethnic minority actor control and multicultural conditions respectively; the only significant contrast was the minority multiculturalism contrast ( $p = .044$ ).



*Figure 4.* Predicted values for Fisher's z-transformed correlation between actors' initial self-reported attitudes and attitudes expressed during their discussion with their partner as a function of actor ethnicity and ideology condition (Study 2). Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. When actors are White targets have an ethnic minority background and vice versa.

Results of a mediation analysis using the same procedures as in Study 1 provided evidence for the predicted indirect path from the minority multiculturalism contrast to enhanced persuasiveness through greater clarity of expression, although the effect was once again marginal by two-tailed significance standards [90% CI: 0.0042, 0.1942]; without covariates [90% CI: 0.0054, 0.2003]. Thus this analysis provided additional evidence consistent with the idea that salient multiculturalism enhanced minority group members' persuasiveness because it prompted them to express their opinions more clearly.

### *Discussion*

Replicating the key results of Study 1, once again ethnic minority group members for whom multicultural ideology was rendered salient were more apt to convince a White interaction partner to move his or her opinions in the direction of their own ingoing opinions. As well, once again there was tentative evidence that minority group members' enhanced persuasiveness was at least partially due to their communicating their own opinions more clearly and directly when they were primed with multiculturalism. There was no indication that salient multiculturalism had similar implications for dominant group members' persuasiveness or behavioral clarity.

### *General Discussion*

The present results suggest that rendering multiculturalism salient can enhance ethnic minority group members' persuasiveness in intergroup contexts: In face-to-face discussions of controversial social issues with a dominant group member, minority group members left their interaction partner more convinced of their own ingoing point of view when they had been exposed to multicultural ideology before the exchange as compared to when they had not. Minority group members also expressed their own opinions more clearly when exposed to multiculturalism, an effect that appeared to contribute to their ultimate persuasiveness. Notably, although in each case the indirect path was marginal by two-tailed significance standards, it was evident across two different studies involving different ethnic groups.

In revealing a role for salient multiculturalism at the individual level in dyadic exchanges, these findings complement classic research on minority influence. Indeed, the role played by clarity of behavioral expression seems somewhat akin to that of the consistency variable highlighted in previous work on this topic (e.g., Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969). However, the fact that salient multiculturalism enhanced minority persuasiveness without

increasing their resistance to their partner's opinions would seem to fit less well with this perspective.

A number of limitations and lingering questions need to be acknowledged. First, although the results of both studies indicated that salient multiculturalism enhanced the clarity with which minority group members expressed their opinions and suggested that this enhanced clarity contributed to their greater persuasiveness, our data do not directly shed light on the psychological underpinnings of these effects or minority group members' phenomenological experience. Because our main goal was to obtain a maximally clear understanding of the behavioral effects of salient multiculturalism, we did not insert closed-ended self-report measures between the ideology manipulation and the discussion or reporting of post-discussion opinions: We were concerned about interfering with participants' natural thought processes by suggesting to them what we thought the effects of the ideology might be or more generally disrupting their reactions. On an exploratory basis we did administer some self-report questions at the end of Study 1 (see the online *Supplemental Measures and Results* document), but interpretation is difficult given the timing of these measures. We suspect that illuminating the psychological processes underlying the effects of multiculturalism on persuasiveness might be challenging given that there are multiple possible contributing processes, some of which might not be consciously accessible or amenable to self-report.

Further, both studies examined opinion change with respect to controversial social issues, many of which were not necessarily of any special relevance to minority groups. It remains to be seen whether the findings will generalize to issues more directly being advanced by a particular minority group or to other types of social influence.

Finally, in the current studies ideology was manipulated for one member of the interacting dyad, not both. The fact that no effects were evident for White actors in Study 2 (indeed, if anything, the results were in the direction of less persuasiveness) suggests that the link between salient multiculturalism and enhanced persuasiveness of minority group members should still be evident when this ideology is salient to both individuals. However, this is an empirical question. A related issue is that in the current studies participants' assumptions about whether any ideology was salient to their interaction partner are unclear. We suspect that if shared exposure to multicultural ideology were unambiguous stronger effects would be evident with respect to minority group members' persuasiveness, but again this is a question for future research.

Nonetheless, the results of these two experiments raise the intriguing possibility that making multicultural ideology salient might set the stage for minority group members to have a stronger voice and exert greater influence in intergroup exchanges.

## Footnotes

1. Because age is related to persuasion, to control error variance we initially intended to avoid recruiting older individuals in our university student sample. However, ultimately we disregarded age in recruitment to maximize our sample size. When pairs including individuals over 30 are excluded (also limiting age differences across pair members) the multiculturalism effect sizes are bigger, particularly in Study 2.
2. Because we did not have predictions regarding targets' behavioral clarity, we did not conduct the (labor-intensive) coding for these participants in either study.
3. A parallel analysis with initial disagreement as the outcome variable indicated no significant ideology effects (omnibus or specific contrasts) here or in Study 2. The same was true for behavioral extremity.

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